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Leji, Sun was, apart from being “steadfast in politics
and rich in leadership experience,” “familiar with party
affairs and economic work.” Zhao also praised Sun for
having “broad perspectives” on a wide range of issues
of governance (Chongqing Daily [Chongqing], December
21; China News Service, December 21).

have passed muster in terms of tackling tough political
challenges as well as abiding by Beijing’s instructions. The
jury is still out, however, on the equally pivotal issue of
whether they can break new ground in reform as General
Secretary Xi pledged to do during his trip to Shenzhen in
early December.

Hu Chunhua, who took over from the reformist Politburo
member Wang Yang as Guangdong party secretary
in mid-December, is a veteran party functionary with
scant exposure to areas such as finance, foreign trade
or high technology. Having spent 19 years in Tibet and
three years in Inner Mongolia, Hu has ample experience
dealing with tough law-and-order situations, including
defusing the anti-Beijing plots of Tibetan and Mongolian
separatists. It is doubtful, however, whether the fastrising star can satisfactorily accomplish the task, first set
by predecessor Wang, of turning the Pearl River Delta
from “world factory” into a global innovation hub. It is
perhaps significant that upon taking over his Guangdong
job, Hu hewed to the CCP tradition of giving top priority
to establishing a trustworthy and combat-ready corps of
cadres rather than reforming institutions and systems of
governance. “We must put together a [ruling] team that is
united, capable, influential and full of combative [spirit],”
the Hubei-born Hu told local officials (Guangzhou
Daily [Guangzhou], December 19; China News Service,
December 19).

Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown
Foundation. He has worked in senior editorial positions in
international media including Asiaweek newsmagazine, South
China Morning Post and the Asia-Pacific Headquarters of
CNN. He is the author of five books on China, including the
recently published Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New
Leaders, New Challenges. Lam is an Adjunct Professor of
China studies at Akita International University, Japan, and at the
Chinese University of Hong Kong.
***

What Direction for Legal Reform
Under Xi Jinping?
By Carl Minzner

H

opes for reform in China have risen in recent
weeks. Xi Jinping’s decision to make Shenzhen the
site of his first formal inspection tour as party general
secretary spurred predictions that he will seek to assume
Deng Xiaoping’s mantle as an economic reformer (“Xi
Jinping’s ‘Southern Tour’ Reignites Promises of Reform,”
China Brief, December 14, 2012). Similarly, Xi’s speech
regarding China’s need for the rule of law—given on the
30th anniversary of the 1982 constitution—gave rise to
press speculation that he may pursue legal and political
reform (South China Morning Post, December 13, 2012;
AFP, December 4, 2012).

It is unique to China that almost all members of its top
ruling council, the CCP Politburo Standing Committee
(PBSC), since the end of the Cultural Revolution are
former party secretaries of provinces, autonomous
regions or directly administered cities. Amongst the seven
newly-appointed PBSC members, only Liu Yunshan,
who is in charge of the CCP Secretariat, has never been
a provincial party boss. As the mass-circulation Global
Times put it in a commentary, provincial party secretaries
constitute an elite “talent pool” for the CCP’s highest
echelon. “It is the requirement of the Chinese system
that the provincial party secretary must have the ability
to handle the full range of [political] situations,” the
paper said, “They need to have a large ‘magnetic field,” a
sense of authority and ability to project personal warmth.
They must also have a very high level of expertise and
perceptiveness” (Global Times [Beijing], December 19).
There seems little doubt that all the newly-elevated party
secretaries—and to a considerable extent, governors—

Naturally, this comes against the background of a
conservative turn against legal reform by Chinese leaders
in recent years [1]. Since 2005, party authorities have
cooled on the rule-of-law discourse that characterized
the late 1990s and early 2000s. Party political campaigns
have warned Chinese judges and courts against
foreign legal norms. Public interest lawyers have
been subjected to increased pressure, harassment and
periodic disappearances or torture. Moreover, under
6
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the leadership of former party political-legal committee
head and standing committee member, Zhou Yongkang,
extralegal “stability maintenance” (weiwen) institutions
have ballooned in size and influence.

report delivered by Hu and drafted by Xi (“The 18th
Party Congress Work Report: Policy Blueprint for the
Xi Administration,” China Brief, November 30, 2012).
Parallel passages of the 17th and 18th Party Congress
work reports also offer some hints of reform:

New language in official pronouncements now suggests
Chinese leaders intend to reverse at least some of these
policies. This appears to be linked directly to internal party
efforts to curb the power of political-legal committees in
the wake of the Bo Xilai scandal (“Year-End Questions
on Political-Legal Reform,” China Brief, December 14,
2012). This shift has allowed activists some greater space
to advocate for reforms to state practices, including
the reeducation through labor (RETL) system. Central
authorities, however, remain committed to maintaining
party political control, rendering it unclear how far such
legal reforms will be permitted to proceed.

“Each party organization and all party members must
self-consciously operate within the boundaries of the
constitution and the law, and must take the lead in
upholding the authority of the constitution and the
law” (Xinhua, October 24, 2007).
“Since the party has led the people to promulgate
the constitution and laws, the party must operate
within the boundaries of the constitution and laws.
No organization and no individual are entitled to
special powers exceeding the constitution and laws.
It is absolutely impermissible for (any individual in
power) to take their own words as law, to use power to
suppress the law, or to bend the law for ones relatives
or friends” (Xinhua, November 27, 2012) [2].

Changes in Party Rhetoric
Ironically, some of the key linguistic shifts have not
originated (at least on the surface) from Xi himself.
Rather, they came from former Party General Secretary
Hu Jintao during the run-up to the November leadership
handover.

The 18th Party Congress Work Report has marginally
stronger language that the party itself is obligated to
operate within the confines of the constitution and laws.
This, however, remains nuanced by the statement that
the party itself remains the originator of both. Last, the
final sentence clearly implied that this change in nuance
is aimed at combating problems raised by recent scandals,
such as the one surrounding former Chongqing Party
Secretary Bo Xilai.

One such shift originated with Hu’s July 23 speech to
ministerial and provincial heads. Attended by all of the
then-members of Politburo Standing Committee and
presided over by Xi, it was accompanied by an unusually
high degree of media coverage. At the time, the speech
was widely viewed as an opportunity for top Chinese
leaders to demonstrate their unity in the aftermath of
Bo’s dismissal and publicly emphasize Xi’s role as the heir
apparent in the political succession process, but lacking
in substantive content regarding institutional reform
(Reuters, July 24, 2012). This speech, however, appears to
have introduced a new political phrasing (tifa), calling for
authorities to “devote more attention…to the important
uses of rule of law in national governance and social
management (shehui zhili)” (People’s Daily, July 24, 2012).
Since party political-legal authorities had employed “social
management” as an umbrella term for the expansion of
their activities in recent years, this new phrasing appears
to be an implicit rebuke. It suggests that Chinese leaders
may deploy rule-of-law norms strategically to curtail the
power of party political-legal authorities.
Further linguistic changes appeared in the 2012 work

Yet a third example of a change in rhetoric occurred
in the White Paper on Judicial Reform released by the
Information Office of the State Council in October 2012
(The Diplomat, October 13, 2012). Such documents
(issued in 2008 and 2011 as well) serve a regular propaganda
function, reeling off state accomplishments in the field
of human rights. They also serve to transmit the officially
approved political line regarding legal reform.
For example, the 2011 white paper confirmed the shift
away from pro-reform agenda of earlier years. Rather
than emphasizing the need to establish the “rule of law,”
it spoke of building a “socialist legal system with Chinese
characteristics.” Where the 2008 document spoke of these
efforts as a work in progress, the 2011 version stressed
that these efforts were largely completed. It also deleted
7
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discussion of China’s efforts to engage in international
legal cooperation in favor of extensive rhetoric regarding
the inapplicability of foreign legal norms to China.

detention system has been linked to a range of abuses
against detainees. In August, journalists, academics and
citizen activists seized on the case of Tang Hui, a mother
sentenced to a year and a half in a labor camp after
petitioning authorities in search of heavier punishment
for the men who allegedly kidnapped and raped her
11-year old daughter. Tang’s case generated a surge
of sympathetic commentary on micro-blogging sites,
resulting in her release by Chinese authorities seeking to
appease popular sentiment (Guardian, August 16, 2012).
Official commentary in state media appeared to indicate
some central support for broader reform. For example,
a November editorial in the People’s Daily criticized the
RETL system as having devolved into a “tool for attacks
and reprisals” by some officials and singled out the case
of Ren Jianyu, a local official in Chongqing sentenced
to RETL in 2011 for his criticism of Bo Xilai’s policies
(People’s Daily, November 21, 2012). Liberal academics
and activists have since merged their reform calls with
these developments and some have pressed for the
complete abolition of the RETL system (t.163.com/
weifanghe, October 25, 2012).

Now, the 2012 white paper marks a sharp break with
the version issued just a year ago. The politicized
language regarding a “socialist legal system with
Chinese characteristics,” a hallmark in Party politicallegal pronouncements over recent years, has receded.
The white paper clearly states that the current round
of legal reforms begun in 2008 (not coincidentally,
the year that Wang Shengjun, the current conservative
head of the Supreme People’s Court, assumed office) is
“basically finished.” Even more noteworthy, there is not
a single reference in the entire document to the Chinese
Communist Party.
Of course, it is important to not overstate the thrust
of the 2012 white paper. While it characterizes judicial
reform as an integral part of “institutional political
reform” and states that it will continue to strengthen
in the years to come, it gives no concrete suggestions
as to how this will be carried out. It also clearly states
that Chinese judicial reform will proceed from its own
“national characteristics” and will not “copy” models
from other countries.

Nor have they stopped there. Liberal critics have latched
on to new language emanating from central authorities
to push for yet deeper reforms. Academics and public
interest lawyers have held conferences calling for
judicial independence (Dui Hua Human Rights Journal,
December 20, 2012). Jiang Ping, one of the key figures
involved in late 20th century legal reforms, has noted that
Hu Jintao’s July 23rd speech has had a “positive effect,”
but that emphasizing rule of law remains “meaningless”
absent political reform. Jiang specifically criticized hardline policies pursued by party political-legal authorities
in recent years, including heavy emphasis on social
stability, shifts away from efforts to professionalize the
Chinese judiciary and promote court adjudication of
citizen disputes according to law as well as the heavy use
of mediation ratios to evaluate Chinese judges (Hong
Kong Commercial Daily, November 6, 2012). Similarly,
constitutional law scholar Tong Zhiwei has called for
central authorities to back up their statements on reform
with meaningful action, separating party and state organs
and creating mechanisms to supervise rights guaranteed
in the constitution (Time Weekly, December 14, 2012).

Nonetheless, the white paper does suggest that some
Chinese leaders may seek to curb efforts of party politicallegal organs to re-impose greater political controls on the
Chinese judiciary in recent years. The paper also suggests
there may be some openness to dealing with the issue of
judicial and legal reform in a more objective manner.
Implications
Liberal intellectuals and reformist officials have sensed the
shift in political winds. Many view the party political-legal
apparatus as politically vulnerable now, following the fall
of Bo Xilai, central discontent with Zhou Yongkang’s role
in the affair and subsequent central moves to downgrade
the bureaucratic rank of political-legal committees.
Over the fall, this led to a rising tide of criticism directed
at the RETL system run by China’s security organs (New
York Times, December 15, 2012). Used as a convenient
tool to suppress prostitutes, petitioners, political dissidents
and underground church members, this extrajudicial

Such calls for deeper legal and judicial reform face serious
internal opposition. Supreme People’s Court President
8

ChinaBrief

Volume XII s Issue 24 s December 14, 2012

Wang Shengjun, one of the key figures responsible for
recent hard-line policies in the court system, has retained
his seat on the Central Committee. Joseph Fewsmith
predicts Wang will follow the bureaucratic path of his
predecessor, Xiao Yang, and be permitted to serve until
the 19th Party Congress in 2016 (China Leadership
Monitor, No. 40, Forthcoming). Moreover, as of late
December, Wang himself was continuing to reiterate
key themes—such as the importance of social stability
considerations in handling cases and the overriding
emphasis on mediation—that have been hallmarks of
the conservative turn against legal reform in recent years
(Xinhua, December 27, 2012).

•
•
•

•

Additionally, prior experience suggests caution in
evaluating the promise of legal reform by new party
leaders. Following Hu Jintao’s accession as party
general secretary in 2002, the appointment of moderate
reformers to government posts and an increase in official
rule-of-law rhetoric, domestic and foreign observers
sensed Chinese authorities might be open to meaningful
legal reform. This led to a surge of activism by citizens,
journalists and legal activists regarding an extralegal
detention system (custody and repatriation) linked to
the abuse and deaths of detainees [3]. When the new
party authorities abolished the system in 2003, many
took this as a sign that China’s constitutional moment
perhaps had dawned (“NPCSC: The Vanguard of China’s
Constitution?” China Brief, February 4, 2008).

Carl Minzner is an associate professor at Fordham Law
School specializing in China law and governance. Prior to
entering academia, he served as Senior Counsel to the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China. He is the
author of “China’s Turn Against Law” (American Journal
of Comparative Law, 2011).

Notes:
1. Carl Minzner, “China’s Turn Against Law,” American
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 59, No. 4, 2011, p. 935,
available online <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1767455>.
2. Author’s translation from the original.
3. Keith Hand, “Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The
Sun Zhigang Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen
Action in the People’s Republic of China,” Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2006, p.
114, available online <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972011>.

A decade later, however, it appeared that these hopes had
been premature (“Constitutionalizing Wukan: The Value
of the Constitution Outside the Courtroom,” China Brief,
February 3, 2012). Once the new party authorities had
navigated successfully the domestic political transition,
officials moved to curtail the judicial institutions, the
rule-of-law rhetoric and the public interest lawyers that
had marked the late Jiang and early Hu periods.

***

So is the current bout of reformist language a marker of
real change or simply a transitory artifact of party divisions
arising from the fight over leadership succession? Since
it remains highly unlikely that central authorities will
announce the creation of meaningful electoral or legal
checks on party power, here are some other potential
markers to watch over the coming year:
•

profile of the Chinese judiciary vis-à-vis that of the
public security organs;
Whether concrete performance evaluation
measures facing local officials
are altered, particularly the hard-line emphasis in
recent years on maintaining social stability and
controlling citizen petitioners;
Whether the content of official “model judge”
propaganda campaigns—which has shifted in
recent years away from an emphasis on judicial
professionalism in favor of revived Maoist
populism—is altered to reflect the new language
coming from the center;
Whether official pressure and repression of public
interest lawyers is reduced.

Whether personnel reforms raise the bureaucratic
9

